user an opportunity, one can help prevent crimes (Cullen and Agnew 2011) . In short, SCP believes manipulating opportunities is a more promising crime prevention strategy than trying to make people less criminally inclined (Clarke 1980) . Similar concepts such as problemoriented policing and crime prevention through environmental design all seek to reduce opportunities for crime in practical ways at low social and economic cost (Cohen et al. 1980) . Along this line, some conceptual frameworks have been proposed to mitigate insider threats from an opportunity-based perspective (Beebe and Rao 2005; Padayachee 2013 Padayachee , 2015 Padayachee , 2016 Willison 2006; Willison and Backhouse 2006; Willison and Siponen 2009 ). However, most of these discussions and investigations are conceptual or qualitative in nature. Empirical evidence through the application of environmental criminology such as multilevel criminal opportunity theory is sparse.
To help fill in the literature gap, this study empirically investigates the applicability of environmental criminology, specifically multilevel criminal opportunity theory, to explain unauthorized access attempts. We contextualize the aforementioned theory in the domain of insider threats and examine the role of opportunity contexts in driving insider threats to information systems in a financial institution. Under what circumstances will insiders be more likely to make unauthorized attempts?
Unit of analysis IS Application.
Employee-month.
Dependent Variables
1. The inter-arrival times of two consecutive unauthorized attempts on an application. 2. The number of unauthorized attempts on an application in a unit time.
The number of repeated unauthorized attempts an employee had in a month.
Theoretical Framework
Routine activity theory. Multilevel criminal opportunity theory.
Hypotheses
Application characteristics that reflect value, inertia, visibility, and accessibility contributes to the victimization risk of an application.
Insiders accessing the IS applications under the contexts presenting an opportunity to exploit will be more likely to make unauthorized attempts. Analysis Techniques 1. Survival analysis with a Weibull hazard model. 2. Count data analysis with a zero-inflated Poisson-Gamma model.
Multilevel linear regression.

Findings
The study investigates victimization risk and attack proneness associated with IS applications. It supports the empirical application of routine activity theory in understanding insider threats, and provide a picture of how different applications have different levels of exposure to such threats.
This study investigates how opportunity contexts impact employees' unauthorized access attempts on IS applications. It contextualizes multilevel criminal opportunity theory and suggests the important roles of contextual variables in leading to insider threats. Further, it shows that the results do not align with employees who might not know the systems well enough and could be making mistakes.
